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Abstract
This paper measured the significant factors leading to performance challenges across state-owned refineries in Nigeria based 
on experts’ views. The study was carried out with a view of making policy recommendations to help address these issues and 
thereby improve performance. A quantitative approach was adopted to sample the viewpoints of the professionals who work 
across the NNPC refineries. Using a Likert-type questionnaire, the professionals’ expert opinions were ranked across four 
main categories covering political, economic, social, and technical (PEST) factors. A Cronbach alpha test was performed 
to certify the consistency and reliability of the sub-category factors included on the Likert scale. In addition, a multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was carried out to check for any statistically significant differences in the respondents’ 
opinions as a result of their different years of work experience. The study revealed that while all four PEST factors are cru-
cial to the performance of the state-owned refineries in Nigeria, political, economic, and technical factors were viewed as 
more significant than the social factors. A comparative analysis of the sub-category factors using the relative significance 
index (RSI) and the respondents’ mean scores of importance (RMSI) revealed that government interference, funding issues, 
political indecision, theft and pipeline attacks, cost of spare parts, maintenance issues, operating capital, feedstock supply, 
staff training and competence issues are some of the significant factors that affect the performance of the refineries. The 
identified performance challenges from this study were used to inform policy recommendations to help address the problems 
of the refineries.
Keywords Nigerian refineries · Performance challenges · Capacity utilisation · Policies · Relative significant index
Introduction
The poor performance of state-owned petroleum refineries 
in Nigeria has been the subject of much academic discourse 
[1, 26, 47, 71]. The interest generated by this industry is 
understandably underpinned by its impact on the average 
cost of living in Nigeria. This is because the non-availability 
of locally refined petroleum products (RPPs) in Nigeria usu-
ally result in their costly imports, thereby raising the cost of 
transportation and commodities with the consumer at the 
receiving end [64]. Essentially, the efficiency of this industry 
will positively contribute to the national economy by help-
ing to stabilise the cost of businesses and save the nation 
unnecessary costs from imports [46, 61].
Nigeria has four State-owned refineries operated by its 
National Oil Company—Nigerian National Petroleum Cor-
poration (NNPC). These refineries have a total installed 
capacity of 445,000 barrels per stream day (BPSD) and are 
strategically located across the country at Kaduna, Warri, 
and Port Harcourt. The Port Harcourt refineries comprise 
the two refineries built in 1965 and 1989 with a current 
capacity of 60,000-bpsd and 150,000-bpsd, respectively. 
The other two refineries were built in 1978 in Warri and 
1980 in Kaduna with current capacities of 125,000-bpsd and 
110,000-bpsd, respectively [69, 71].
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With the total demand of RPPs in Nigeria in the range 
of 600,000–700,000 barrels per day (bpd) [47], it is sur-
prising that the local refineries only function at less than 
20% of their combined installed capacity [39]. According 
to Iheukwumere et al. [24], for more than 2 decades, the 
low productivity of these refineries has gradually created a 
significant gap of about 500,000–600,000 bpd of RPPs in 
the country. This gap is currently being filled by imports 
from northwestern Europe, the United States, and the Mid-
dle East [54].
By comparison, the performance of NNPC refineries lags 
significantly behind even by the standards of the Organisa-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) [54]. For 
instance, the data obtained from NNPC Annual Statistical 
Bulletins from 2001 to 2019, illustrate the extent of this 
decrease over time. Figure 1 shows that the average com-
bined capacity utilisation (percentage ratio of production 
to installed capacity) of the four NNPC refineries has been 
below 20% since 2013. The few spikes in the chart repre-
sent occasional periods of improved performance brought 
about by short-term technical interventions in some of the 
refineries [11].
This decline is quite untypical for other State-run refin-
eries within OPEC member states, such as Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, and others, with better utilisation rates [51]. 
According to reports from Oil and Energy Trends [48], the 
average capacity utilisation for Middle East refineries in 
2018 was 86.4%, which is more than the global average of 
83.5%. This implies that NNPC’s average refinery utilisation 
rate is only about 24% of the global average.
In addition, Nigeria’s per capita local refining capacity 
is currently the least amongst OPEC countries, except for 
Equatorial Guinea, which currently has no refineries [51]. 
Data obtained from OPEC statistical bulletin for 2019 show 
that while countries in the Middle East lead with impressive 
per capita refining margins, Nigeria lags significantly behind 
with about 0.04 barrels of locally refined petroleum prod-
ucts (RPPs) for every 1000 persons. This is a sharp contrast 
from the figures for other African OPEC member States like 
Algeria and Libya with per capita refining capacity of 15 
and 9 bpd, respectively, for every 1000 persons [51]. It is, 
therefore, no surprise that Nigeria’s imports of RPPs are far 
more than those of other OPEC member States.
Clearly, Nigeria’s standard falls far below industry expec-
tations and demands urgent corrective action. Expectedly, 
this issue has received much attention from the Nigerian 
government and certain efforts have equally been made in 
the past to address these problems, albeit without much 
success [21, 26, 71]. Some of the efforts made include the 
occasional refurbishment of the refineries, the award of 
licences to the private sector for the construction of small-
to-medium-scale modular refineries and the attempted sale 
or acquisition of the refineries by the private sector [4, 37]. 
The failure of these initiatives has been linked to several 
factors, mainly within the categories of political, economic, 
social, and technical (PEST) issues [47, 54, 71].
Using the findings from research, this study identified the 
relevant performance challenges of the refineries as indi-
cated by Table 1.
The identified factors as shown in Table 1 were measured 
using a Likert-type questionnaire to obtain the professional 
opinions of experts who work in the four State-run refiner-
ies. The study was limited in scope to the effects of the PEST 
factors on how they affect the performance of the refineries. 
PEST is a recognised tool for the analysis of relevant issues 
affecting an organisation’s performance with regards to its 
business environment [30]. According to Yuksel [73], the 
PEST framework helps focus research questions around rel-
evant feasible issues.
In context, political factors (P) imply the various 
forms of government interventions, applicable national 
legislations, expert regional projections, and outlook. 
It also includes identified political factors from pub-
lished sources, which directly or indirectly impact on the 
refineries’ performance. Economic factors (E) involve 
the macroeconomic conditions, such as project costs 
Fig. 1  Combined Capacity 
Utilization of NNPC refineries 
(2001–2019). Source: Author 
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and expectations, competing factors for government 
resources and their implications on the refineries’ per-
formance. Social factors (S) include the various social, 
cultural, behavioural, and other demographic factors of 
the external environment which bear direct or indirect 
consequences on the refineries, while technical factors 
(T) refer to the various technologically related activities, 
infrastructures, training, skills, including gaps in local 
capacity, which present challenges to the refineries’ 
operations.
To understand the challenges of the NNPC refineries, 
it is necessary to present brief information about these 
assets, including their process units.
Port Harcourt Refining Company (PHRC I and II)
The Port Harcourt refinery comprises the old refinery 
(PHRC I) with 60,000-bpsd and the new refinery (PHRC II) 
with 150,000-bpsd. According to Turner [69], PHRC I was 
built by a consortium of Shell-BP and initially had a shared 
ownership structure of 50% government stake and 25% stake 
each for Shell and BP. However, the facility was acquired by 
the Nigerian government in an outright buyout in 1979 due 
to geopolitical reasons [47].
According to information from NNPC website, NNPC 
[41], the Port Harcourt refineries houses several process 
units across five process areas 1–5. Some of the key units 
include the Crude Distillation Unit (CDU), Vacuum Distil-
lation Unit (VDU), Naphtha Hydrotreating Unit (NHU), the 
Catalytic Reforming Unit (CRU), the Kero Hydrotreating 
Unit (KHU), and the Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU).
The PHRC produces a wide range of refined petroleum 
products (RPPs), such as Premium Motor Spirit (PMS), Liq-
uified Petroleum Gas (LPG), Automotive Gas Oil (AGO), 
Kerosene (aviation and domestic), Low Pour Fuel Oil 
(LPFO) and High Pour Fuel Oil (HPFO).
According to data from NNPC Annual Statistical Bul-
letins (ASB) (2001–2019), PHRC I has remained mostly 
Table 1  A summary of PEST factors affecting NNPC refineries
Factors References
Political factors
 Govt interference Ogbuigwe [47], Akinola [1], Wapner [71], and Sayne et al. [63]
 Funding issues Chima et al. [13] and Ambituuni et al. [2]
 Political indecision Chikwem [12]
 Government commitment/political will Iwayemi [26] and PwC [54]
 Managerial appointments Sancino et al. [60]
Economic factors
 Cost of spare parts Kennedy-Darling et al. [33]
 Subsidy issues Akinola [1], Iwayemi [26] and Ambituuni et al. [2]
 Operating capital Eti et al. [17]
 Exchange rates Wapner [71] and Gary et al. [20]
 Profit margins Gary et al. [20]
Social factors
 Theft/attacks on pipelines Siddig et al. [64], Iwayemi [26], Wapner [71] and Onuoha [50]
 Illegal refining Ikelegbe [25] and Boris [9]
 Security issues Boris [9]
 Compensations Izere [27]
 Collusion and sabotage Akinola [1], Siddig et al. [64], Bazilian and Onyeji [5] and Wapner [71]
 Grievances and community disputes Ikelegbe [25] and Obi [45]
Technical factors
 Maintenance issues Iwayemi [26], Bazilian and Onyeji [5] and Siddig et al. [64]
 Ageing facilities Iwayemi [26], Ambituuni et al. [2] and Eti et al. [17]
 Facility design Eti et al. [18] and Turner [69]
 Feedstock supply Eti et al. [18]
 Staff training Chima et al. [13] and Turner [69]
 Staff competence Chima et al. [13]
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inoperative for the past 10 years while PHRC II continues to 
run at low capacity. Unfortunately, since 2019, these facili-
ties have been mostly under a shutdown for a maintenance 
pre-inspection [58].
Warri Refining and Petrochemical Company (WRPC)
The Warri refinery (WRPC) is the first Nigerian government 
wholly owned refinery [69]. Built in 1978 by the Italian 
Snamprogetti at a cost of US $478M, WRPC has a current 
installed capacity of 125,000-bpsd [71]. Chima et al. [13] 
note that WRPC was installed as a complex conversion plant 
to process LPG, PMS, kerosene, AGO and fuel oil. It also 
produces propylene pellets from propylene-rich feed as well 
as carbon black from fuel oil. The facility was set up to take 
crude oil from a blend of Escravos and Ughelli crudes [40].
According to Chima et al. [13], the main process units at 
the Warri refinery include the Crude Distillation Unit, Naph-
tha Hydrotreating Unit, Catalytic Reformer Unit, Kerosene 
Hydrotreating Unit, Vacuum Distillation Unit, and the Fluid 
Catalytic Cracker Unit.
Recently, WRPC has experienced significant production 
interruptions due to several challenges arising from attacks 
on its crude oil supply pipelines and constant breakdown due 
to technical difficulties [47, 71]. Consequently, the capacity 
utilisation of this plant has fluctuated currently to sub-20% 
levels over the last decade (NNPC ASB 2001–2019).
Kaduna Refining and Petrochemical Company 
(KRPC)
The Kaduna refinery (KRPC) was built in 1979 by the Japa-
nese Chiyoda Engineering and Construction Company at a 
cost of US $575M [71]. The facility has a current installed 
capacity of 110,000-bpsd. The refinery comprises two 
plants—a Fuels plant of 60,000-bpsd and a Lubes plant of 
50,000-bpsd capacity. The main process units at the KRPC 
include the Crude Distillation Unit (CDU), Vacuum Distil-
lation Unit (VDU), Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU), 
Naphtha Hydrotreating Unit (NHU), Kerosene Hydrotreater, 
Catalytic Reforming, and Sulphur Recovery unit [42]. KRPC 
was designed to process Nigerian crudes at the Atmospheric 
and Crude Distillation Unit (CDU) of its Fuels plant and 
imported heavy crudes at its Lubes plant. The Fuels plant 
of the refinery processes LPG, PMS, kerosene, and fuel oil. 
On the other hand, the Lubes plant, was designed to process 
heavy imported crude from Kuwait, Venezuela, Saudi Ara-
bia, and Russia. It also has a capacity to produce lube-based 
oils, asphalts, and waxes [42].
However, according to Reuters [58], KRPC has also 
been under a shutdown since 2019 for a maintenance 
pre-inspection.
Based on these characteristics, the complexity of NNPC 
refineries may be classified using Gary et al. [20] complexity 
table as shown in Table 2.
Table 2 shows that the PHRC I can be classified as a sim-
ple topping/hydro-skimming refinery, while WRPC, KRPC 
and PHRC II were built as complex refineries with catalytic 
cracking capabilities. None of the NNPC refineries can be 
classified as very complex facilities as none is equipped with 
coking capabilities.
Experimental methods
This study was designed to identify the significant fac-
tors that lead to the performance challenges across all the 
state-owned refineries in Nigeria. Using the findings from 
literature and other relevant documents, the identified fac-
tors were categorised across political, economic, social, 
and technical (PEST) issues. The factors were first used 
to develop a pilot questionnaire to obtain the professional 
opinions of 25 senior staff members of the NNPC Group. 
The findings led to an improvement of the questionnaire, 
which was later deployed across the NNPC refineries 
(PHRC I and II (PHRC), WRPC and KRPC). The ques-
tionnaire targeted at least 200 personnel with a minimum 
of 3-year experience. This was to ensure that the survey 
respondents have a good grasp of knowledge about the 
challenges of the refineries. It is important to note that 
Table 2  Refinery classification based on types and complexity
Source: Author generated (adapted from Gary et al. [20])
Complexity Refinery types Process technology Type of output products NNPC refineries
Simple Topping Atmospheric distillation (AD) Naphtha and middle distillate fuels PHRC I
Hydro-skimming AD + catalytic reforming PMS or gasoline
Complex Cracking refinery AD + vacuum distillation and 
catalytic cracking
Light and middle distillates, such as 
jet fuels, heating kerosene and gas 
and diesel oils
PHRC II, WRPC and KRPC
Very complex Coking refinery AD + residue destruction Light, middle and heavy distillates 
(PMS, kerosene, diesel, jet fuels 
and heavy fuel oils)
Currently, no govt-owned refin-
ery in Nigeria has this level of 
complexity
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PHRC I and II are treated as a single unit (PHRC) given 
that the facilities are co-located and are managed as a sin-
gle company by NNPC.
A five-point Likert-type questionnaire was designed to 
obtain the experts’ views of these professionals on which 
PEST factors have more significant impact on the perfor-
mance of the refineries. Likert-type scale was used because 
they have been proven useful for evaluating interactive expe-
riences of respondents to obtain quantified data regarding 
their attitudes, behaviours, and judgements [29, 32].
The questionnaire, which dealt on generic performance 
issues across the refineries, was deployed from 10 December 
2018 to 30 June 2019 via an online platform using Google 
forms for ease of access. It was cascaded to members of the 
organisation using a purposive and snowballing sampling 
approach. This was to ensure that only the relevant experts, 
who are more familiar with the refinery issues were targeted 
[10].
Respondents were asked the following questions:
How would you rank the impact of political, economic, 
social, and technical factors on the performance of your 
refinery?
How would you rank the impact of the following sub-
political factors on the refinery’s performance? [Govt inter-
ference, Funding issues, Political indecision, Government 
commitment/Political will, Managerial appointments].
How would you rank the impact of the following sub-
economic factors on the refinery’s performance?
[Cost of spare parts, Subsidy issues, Operating capital, 
Exchange rates, Profit margins].
How would you rank the impact of the following sub-
social factors on the refinery’s performance?
[Theft/attacks on pipelines, Illegal refining, Security 
issues, Compensations, Collusion and sabotage, Grievances 
and community disputes].
How would you rank the impact of the following sub-
technical factors on the refinery’s performance?
[Maintenance issues, Ageing facilities, Facility design, 
Feedstock supply, Staff training, Staff competence]
The options for ranking these factors ranged from Least 
Impact representing 1 and Highest Impact representing 5 
on the Likert scale. However, 118 respondents (59%) of the 
targeted sample size completed the questionnaire. Overall, 
these respondents were made up of engineers/technicians 
(70%), administrators (24%), and Managers (6%). In addi-
tion, 65 (55%) of the respondents have 3–9 years of experi-
ence, while 53 (45%) have 10 + years of experience on the 
job as shown in Table 3.
Further indications from Table 3 reveal that 58% of the 
respondents were from Port Harcourt refineries (PHRC), 
23% from Kaduna refinery (KRPC) and the remaining 22% 
from Warri refinery (WRPC). Most of the respondents (54%) 
hold at least a BSc/HND degree, while 46% hold a master’s 
degree.
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)
To ensure there was no variation in the responses of the 
participants because of their different years of experience 
on the job (3–9 years and 10 + years), a MANOVA test was 
carried out.
Also, to ensure the equality of variance across all the 
variables, a conservative alpha level of 0.01 was used for 
determining significance [65].
To check for any statistically significant difference across 
the responses of the age groups, the Wilk’s Lambda value is 
calculated [53] using Eq. (1), as shown:
where Λ is equal to Wilk’s lambda, and Π is the multipli-
cation equivalent of sum, while 1 +  is the proportion of 
variance in the dependent variable.
With the aid of the Statistical Package for the Social Sci-
ences (SPSS) software, the Wilks’ Lambda value was found 
to be 0.965 with a corresponding significance level of 0.400 
(which is above 0.01) as shown in Table 4.
The result from Table 4 shows that there is statistically 
no significant difference across the participants’ responses 
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Cronbach alpha test
To certify the consistency and reliability of all the sub-cat-
egory factors in the questionnaire, the Cronbach alpha was 
calculated using Eq. (2), as shown. This is because, accord-
ing to Santos [62], Cronbach alpha is useful for determining 
the internal consistency or average correlation of items on a 
multi-point survey instrument to gauge its reliability.
where α equals to the Cronbach alpha, N is the number of 
items, Ĉ is the average inter-item covariance among the 
items and Ṽ equals the average variance [66]. Using the 
SPSS, the results for  were determined as shown in Table 5.
Table 5 shows Cronbach alpha values of 0.808, 0.796, 
0.903, and 0.874 for the political, economic, social, and 
technical factors, respectively. Having exceeded the mini-
mum acceptable value of 0.7, it then implies that all the cat-
egory factors meet the acceptable level of reliability [44, 62].
Participants’ opinions
This study adopted two approaches for measuring the signifi-
cant factors of the PEST variables based on the participants’ 
opinions. The first approach was to determine the Respond-
ents Mean Scores of Importance (RMSI), while the second 
was to calculate the Relative Significance Index (RSI) of the 
responses. These two approaches were considered necessary 
to improve the level of detail for the results of the findings 
[22].
Respondents Mean Scores of Importance (RMSI)
Boateng et al. [8] applied the RMSI to determine the sig-
nificant socio-technical risks in the construction industry. 
RMSI can be calculated by a weighted quantitative scoring 
(WQS) method using the respondents’ higher scores on the 
Likert scale. In this study, the higher scores on the Likert 
scale for High Impact represented by 4 and Highest Impact 
represented by 5 were used to calculate the RMSI of the 
PEST variables as well as their sub-category variables.
Using Eq. (3), RMSI can be calculated as shown:
(2)𝛼 =
NĈ




 is the participant’s score of importance for each 
category/sub-category factor on the Likert scale, and n is 
the highest degree of ranking for items on the Likert scale 
(n = 5, for a Five-Point Likert Scale).
Relative Significance Index (RSI)
The Relative Significance Index (RSI) is a useful statistical 
measure for determining the most important criteria from a 
set of variables based on the participants’ responses [7, 28, 
59]. It is also an appropriate tool for prioritising indicators 
rated on a Likert-type scale [31]. According to Gündüz et al. 
(2013), the values for RSI lie in the range of 0 ≤ RSI ≤ 1 with 
the higher values, especially greater than 0.6, as the more 
significant index. In this study, RSI is applied to obtain the 
more significant factors amongst the PEST factors as well as 
their sub-factors. The formula for RSI is as shown in Eq. (4):
where µ the weighting given to each factor by the respond-
ents, ranging from 1 to 5, A highest value weight, which is 
5 in this case, and N total number of respondents, which 
is 118, and n5, n4, n3, n2 and n1 = highest impact, high 
impact, moderate impact, low impact and lowest impact, 
respectively.
Results
Following the responses from the questionnaire, the 
Respondents’ Mean Scores of Importance (RMSI) were 
computed as demonstrated in Table 6. For example, follow-
ing the question on the questionnaire:
How would you rank the impact of the following PEST 
factors on the refinery’s performance?
The weighted responses from the participants across the 















(5n5 + 4n4 + 3n3 + 2n2 + 1n1)∕5N,
Table 4  Multivariate test
Effect Wilks’ Lambda’s value Sig
How many years have you worked in 
this refinery?
0.965 0.400
Table 5  Cronbach alpha calculations
Factors No. of items Cronbach’s alpha Cronbach’s alpha based 
on standardized items
Political 5 0.808 0.824
Economic 5 0.796 0.804
Social 7 0.903 0.904
Technical 6 0.874 0.875
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The results from Table 6 were plotted as shown in Figs. 2, 
3, 4, 5 and 6 to show the percentage weight of the levels of 
importance of the PEST factors and the sub-factors accord-
ing to the participants’ opinions.
Figure 2 shows that across the refineries, the respondents 
scored political factors highest at above 80%. For economic 
factors, respondents from KRPC scored it 59.26%, those 
from PHRC scored it 56.52% while those from KRPC scored 
63.64%. Social factors appeared to score less with 48.15% 
for KRPC, 56.52% for PHRC and 54.55% for WRPC. On 
the other hand, technical factors appeared to score high 
with 62.96% for KRPC, 60.87% for PHRC, and 72.73% for 
WRPC.
For the political factors, the same process was repeated 
with the results for the three refineries plotted as shown in 
Fig. 3.
Glancing at Fig. 3, reveals that the higher scoring sub-
political factors across the refineries were Government 
interference with 66.67% for KRPC, 81.16% for PHRC and 
77.27% for WRPC. Also, Funding issues with 62% (KRPC), 
73% (PHRC) and 72% (WRPC). Similarly, Political indeci-
sion scored 70% for KRPC, 75% for PHRC and 72% for 
WRPC. This is followed by Government commitment with 
51%, 59% and 54% at KRPC, PHRC and WRPC, respec-
tively. Lastly, Managerial appointments scored 44% at 
KRPC, 49% at PHRC and 45% at WRPC.
For the economic factors, Fig. 4 represents the plot for the 
participants’ responses.
The plot for the sub-economic factors as shown in Fig. 4 
reveals that Cost of spare parts scored high across the refin-
eries with approximately 70%. Operating capital appeared 
to score high as well with PHRC leading with a score of 69% 
above KRPC and WRPC with 62% and 63%, respectively. 
Exchange rates appeared to score high as well with scores of 
60%, 63.77% and 63.64% across KRPC, PHRC and WRPC, 
respectively. Profit margins also scored 55%, 47% and 54% 
for KRPC, PHRC and WRPC, respectively. While Subsidy 
issues scored 44% (KRPC), 42% (PHRC), and 45% (WRPC).
For the social factors, the plot for the respondents’ rank-
ing on the refinery’s performance is as shown in Fig. 5.
Figure 5 shows that scores for Theft/attacks on pipelines, 
varied across the refineries with 66.67% at KRPC, 73.91% 
at PHRC and 81.82% at WRPC. Similarly, the scores for 
illegal refining were 14.81% at KRPC, 42.03% at PHRC and 


















Rankings 1 2 3 4 5 Cols (4) + (5) Grand total % Weight factors
KRPC 5 4 18 22 27 81.48
PHRC 2 2 7 15 43 58 69 84.06


















Rankings 1 2 3 4 5 Cols (4) + (5) Grand total % Weight factors
KRPC 6 5 7 9 16 27 59.26
PHRC 4 6 20 22 17 39 69 56.52


















Rankings 1 2 3 4 5 Cols (4) + (5) Grand total % Weight factors
KRPC 3 4 7 9 4 13 27 48.15
PHRC 3 15 12 26 13 39 69 56.52


















Rankings 1 2 3 4 5 Cols (4) + (5) Grand total % Weight factors
KRPC 2 2 6 5 12 17 27 62.96
PHRC 4 3 20 24 18 42 69 60.87
WRPC 6 10 6 16 22 72.73
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45.45% at WRPC. Security issues scored 55.56% (KRPC), 
66.67% (PHRC) and 68.18% at WRPC. Scores for Compen-
sations were all below 20% across the refineries. Collusion 
and sabotage also ranked between 25% (KRPC) and 28% 
(PHRC) across the refineries. Grievances and community 
disputes also registered a varied score of 29% (KRPC), 52% 
PHRC and 54% (WRPC). Lastly, Stakeholder involvements 
registered a moderate score that fell between 25% at KRPC 
and 31% at PHRC.
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For the technical factors, the rankings of the respondents 
are tabulated and plotted as shown in Fig. 6.
Figure 6 indicates that Maintenance issues scored 74% 
at KRPC, 71% at PHRC and 81.8% at WRPC. Ageing refin-
ery plant scored between 70% (KRPC) to 73% (PHRC) 
across the refineries. For Limited plant capacity, the scores 
were 59% for both KRPC and WRPC, and 53% at PHRC. 
Feedstock supply registered a score of 81%, 72% and 81% 
for WRPC, PHRC and WRPC, respectively. Staff training 
scored between 51% (KRPC) to 63% (WRPC), while staff 
competence registered a score of 70% (KRPC), 65% (PHRC) 
and 72% (WRPC).
To provide an overall comparison of the relative sig-
nificance of the entire sub-factors, the RSI is employed to 
calculate these values. First, we compute Table 7 for the 
main PEST factors as well as the sub-factors using the RSI 
formula shown in Eq. (4) (Sect. 2.4).
The result of the RSI for the PEST factors and sub-factors 
is as shown in Table 7.
Table 7 shows that while all the main PEST factors appear 
significant with values above 0.6, political factors scored 
0.8864; technical, 0.7814; economic, 0.7136; and social, 
0.6847.
Discussion and analysis
The overall results show that the refinery experts view 
political factors as the most significant factor leading to 
the performance challenges of the refineries. This is fol-
lowed by the technical, economic, and social factors.
Political factors
All the political factors measured by this study appeared 
to have much significance to the refineries’ performance, 
except managerial appointments. The leading political fac-
tors appear to be government interference, funding issues 
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and political indecision. Ogbuigwe [47] report that since the 
refineries lost control of their self-governing authorities in 
the early 1990s, they have struggled with funding issues for 
regular repairs and maintenance. This is further supported 
by Wapner [71], who suggests that there is a high level of 
government interference with its multilayer of administra-
tive bureaucracy required to obtain funding approval for 
any major repairs/maintenance at the refineries. Essentially, 
interference from the government on the refineries usually 
delays decision-making processes and prolongs intervention 
time. The consequence of this is the eventual breakdown of 
the plants, which could otherwise be avoided. It is important 
to note that these factors appear to affect all the NNPC refin-
eries significantly, given the nature of their central control 
by the government via the NNPC Group.
Unfortunately, the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) drafted 
by the Nigerian government more than a decade ago to 
address these lapses failed for 17 years to secure parlia-
mentary approval [15, 34, 47, 49]. This provides evidence 
why Political indecision also ranks high on the significance 
scale. Although a re-worked version of a segment of the PIB 
is to be reconsidered by the Nigerian parliament, experts 
suggest many opportunities have already been lost because 
of this delay [34, 54]. According to projections from McK-
insey [35], demand patterns for RPPs vary across regions. 
While Europe and North America are likely to continue 
on a decline of about 0.3% per annum in RPP demand up 
to the year 2035, demand for RPPs in developing regions 
like Africa, Asia and Latin America will likely continue to 
grow at about 2% per annum for the same period. These 
projections appear to be consistent with global develop-
ments around refinery projects across Middle East, Asia, and 
Africa [68]. For example, the ongoing construction of Dan-
gote refinery in Nigeria, is expected to add about 650,000 
bpd of capacity to the country by 2022 [54, 56].
To address political issues on the performance of Nige-
ria’s refineries, some studies have suggested privatisation as 
an outright solution for the NNPC refineries [1, 47]. How-
ever, this move has been previously opposed in 2007 by the 
Nigerian public and some civil society groups like the Nige-
rian Labour Congress, when the refineries had been put up 
for outright sale [55]. A review of this option is worth inves-
tigating, including suggestions to adopt the operating model 
of the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) Company in 
which the ownership of the assets would be shared by multi-
nationals. As in September 2020, there were talks within the 
management of NNPC to give up a controlling stake of the 
refineries to private foreign and local investors [54]. This 
could be a viable alternative, especially when regulations on 
the Nigerian downstream market for fixed petroleum pump 
price is fully lifted. Although this initiative could further 
raise the prices of refined petroleum products in the country; 
however, it appears to be an appropriate way a private sector 
can profitably run the assets on a sustainable basis.
It should be noted, however, that contrary to common 
views that state-owned enterprises generally lack efficiency 
because of their bureaucratic nature, which informs their 
poor management and lack of coherent strategy [36]. More 
recent studies have, however, contended these views with 
the evidence that some state-owned enterprises have over-
come some of these shortcomings and have rather emerged 
as global leaders in their business sector [14]. For example, 
state-owned Chinese refineries operated by Sinopec, Petro-
China, CNOOC and SinoChem have continued to dominate 
most of the regional East Asian market and have continued 
to perform well above 80% utilisation rates (S&P Global 
2020). In addition, Brazil’s Petrobras owns a 100,000-bpd 
refinery in Texas; 100,000 bpd refinery in Okinawa, Japan 
and another 30,000-bpd refinery in Bahia Blanca, Argentina. 
Saudi Aramco, on the other hand, owns about 1.2 mn distil-
lation capacity through outright ownership or joint ventures 
in Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Kuwait Petro-
leum International (KPI) owns about 200,000 bpd refin-
ing capacity in Italy and Vietnam [48]. It is, therefore, not 
impossible for NNPC to also operate in the multinational 
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arena by expanding its operations first to neighbouring West 
African countries where there is an additional 39 billion 
litres (245 million barrel) annual demand for RPPs [54]. 
To achieve this leap, however, a major restructure of NNPC 
Group incorporating partnerships with multinational organi-
sations would be essential.
Technical factors
A glance of the chart for technical factors (Fig. 6) may reveal 
some of the sub-factors with more significance, except for 
their order. However, Table 7 indicates that the leading 
technical factors with significant performance challenges 
are ageing refinery plants, maintenance issues, feedstock 
(crude oil) supply and staff competence and training, while 
limited plant capacity appears the least. It is important to 
note that except for slight variations across the refineries 
(Fig. 6), these factors appear to mainly affect the refineries 
in much the same way. This observation is quite consistent 
with the views of Eti et al. [18], and Ogbuigwe [47] that 
ageing refinery equipment accompanied by a lack of regular 
maintenance leads to frequent breakdowns of the facilities. 
In addition, Akinola [1], Ambituuni et al. [2], and Ogbuigwe 
[47] note that difficulties in accessing crude oil supplies via 
pipelines constitute a major challenge for the refineries.
A robust maintenance culture across the entire organisa-
tion will be crucial to run the refineries effectively. Eti et al. 
[19] suggest that a condition-based maintenance (CBM) in 
which the plants receive the required intervention when fail-
ure is imminent, will be a more cost-effective approach to 
manage the refineries. For this to be effective, there must, 
however, be a scheduled approach for equipment monitor-
ing and inspection on a regular basis. It may be worth re-
engaging NNPC refineries with their original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) on a new contractual arrangement, 
such that their operations can be supported on an ongoing 
basis with their foreign manufacturers. The Nigerian Liq-
uefied Natural Gas (NLNG) company have such arrange-
ments in place, whereby their operations are continually 
technically supported by their OEMs. Some OEMs, such 
as GE and Rolls Royce, have advanced technologies that 
implement digital twins (remote electronic replica) of their 
onsite equipment that receive signals in real time, which help 
provide informed decisions on the mechanical conditions 
of operating equipment [16]. This arrangement has particu-
larly helped NLNG to perform at optimum levels in meeting 
their business expectations. It would be beneficial for future 
contracts for building refineries in Nigeria to consider the 
incorporation of such arrangements over the useful life of 
the assets.
In addition, the training of refinery engineers and techni-
cians can be upgraded from mere operational capabilities to 
target more expertise for troubleshooting, fault detection, 
and replacement/repairs of affected parts. The cooperation 
of the OEMs must, however, be required to facilitate this.
Economic factors
Using the plot for the economic factors (Fig. 4) alongside 
the RSI Table (Table 7), it can be observed that the most 
significant economic performance challenges are spare parts 
cost, operating capital, exchange rates and subsidy issues. 
While profit margins rank the least. Although NNPC does 
not normally publish their financial accounts in the public, 
fortunately, the organisation released its first audited account 
to the public in mid-2020 for the years 2018 and 2019. It is 
important to note that this was the first time the company 
released such documents in its 47 years of operations and 
was reportedly done to initiate transparency and accountabil-
ity in its operations [38, 42]. The released accounts validate 
operating losses across the refineries. For example, the three 
refineries reported a combined operating loss of 170 billion 
naira (bn) (US $404.2 m) for the year 2018 and 147bn (US 
$439.47) for the year 2019 [58]. Specifically, PHRC made a 
loss of N45.5bn (US $119.5 M) in 2018 and N46.9bn (US 
$123 M) in 2019. The KRPC lost some N80.095bn (US 
$210 M) in 2018 and N51.3bn (US $134.5 M) in 2019, while 
WRPC recorded a loss of 44.43bn (US $117 M) in 2018 and 
49.28bn (US $129.6) in 2019 [43, 52]. It is equally important 
to note that the naira to the dollar exchange rate at the time 
the documents were released in June 2020 was about 380 
naira to a dollar. All these losses were accrued despite the 
refineries not producing up to 5% of their installed capacity. 
Particularly, KRPC did not record any production in 2018 
and had a reported zero revenue for that year. The same situ-
ation was applicable to PHRC in 2019 with a reported zero 
revenue for the year [52]. Although not many inferences can 
be drawn with just a 2-year financial record; however, it is 
important to note that these refineries lost nearly a billion 
dollars in combined operating expenses in the 2 years from 
2018 to 2019, which is quite significant.
For exchange rates, Wapner [71] and CBN (2020) report 
that the Nigerian naira fell more than 90% from 199 naira 
per dollar in 2015 to about 380 naira per dollar presently. 
Since NNPC buys its crude oil in dollars and sells the refined 
products in naira, it implies the company also incurs net 
losses due to currency fluctuations with time.
Subsidy issues and profit margins were observed to have 
scored a bit less. This may be because subsidy issues do not 
have much direct impact on the refineries performance but 
escalates as a result of the poor performance of the refiner-
ies. Although high figures for petroleum subsidies may com-
pete with the refineries for government funds; however, clear 
government priorities targeted at increasing local production 
of RPPs will eliminate the need for such expenses.
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Social factors
On social issues, the experts appear to consider attacks on 
pipelines, security issues and grievances and community 
disputes to be the most challenging factors. These factors 
are particularly important to the operations of the refineries 
given their design to be supplied crude oil through pipelines. 
As such, the findings appear to be consistent with a McK-
insey report [35], that supply chain issues associated with 
NNPC pipeline breakdown accounted more for the shutdown 
and low-capacity utilisation of the refineries with 53% of 
the cases, while equipment failure accounted for 47%. This 
implies that security of product movements via the pipelines 
is as vital as routine maintenance checks to keep the refinery 
equipment fully functional.
However, the chart for social factors (Fig. 5), further 
reveals an important variation across the refineries for some 
of the sub-factors. Particularly, respondents from the two 
refineries located in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region (PHRC and 
WRPC) appear to consider the effects of pipeline attacks, 
illegal refining, security issues and grievances and commu-
nity disputes as much more significant than respondents from 
KRPC. For instance, the issue of illegal refining appears to 
be more significant for WRPC and PHRC with 42% and 
45%, respectively, as opposed to that for KRPC with only 
14%. The same applies to Grievances and community dis-
putes with 52% (PHRC) and 54% (WRPC) against 29% for 
KRPC. This may be because the incidents of pipeline attacks 
and its associated communal grievances, including illegal/
artisanal refining occur mostly in the Niger Delta region [6, 
9, 23, 71]. As such, these incidents are hardly observed for 
the Northern Kaduna refinery. The effect of these occur-
rences, however, is only felt at the KRPC through the inabil-
ity to receive feedstock via pipelines due to breaches at the 
southern sections of the pipelines located within the Niger 
Delta.
The seriousness of pipeline disruptions to the refineries’ 
operations is buttressed by the statement of former NNPC 
Group Managing Director (GMD) that only 2.4% of the 
company’s pipeline breakdowns occurred due to rupture 
while the other 97.5% were as a result of vandalization by 
hoodlums [47].
Although, there have been calls to legalise the practice 
of illegal/artisanal refining in the Niger Delta and assist the 
local artisans to upgrade their refining operations to achieve 
an increased yield of RPPs in Nigeria [3, 70]. Unfortunately, 
this debate has been hard to win given other efforts the gov-
ernment is making with its support for private sectors to 
build small-to-medium scale modular refineries, which con-
form better to standard practice. It will be more beneficial, 
though, to engage these illegal/artisanal refiners in asso-
ciated technology practices like welding, fabrication, and 
other technical skills useful to Nigeria’s oil and gas sector. 
Some of these initiatives have already been championed by 
Nigeria’s Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF) 
and should be improved to benefit more Nigerian youths.
Security over pipelines can be stepped up with modern 
technology. Aside from the use of military checkpoints to 
monitor encroaching vandals. The use of CCTV cameras, 
drones and satellite technologies can also be deployed to 
defeat the hoodlums. Yaacoub and Salman [72] report that 
drones have been proven effective as a faster and cheaper 
means of responding to crimes. More importantly, the effec-
tive enforcement of laws to investigate and punish offenders 
when caught in such practices will be crucial to stemming 
the tide. Though the suggested technologies may be more 
expensive, the savings accruing from plugging the losses 
from oil pipelines in Nigeria will justify their cost over time.
The issue of compensations may have ranked low since 
the refineries have hardly suffered from any forms of com-
pensation payments in Nigeria because of their operations. 
The only recent rumour of such compensation claims 
seemed to have stemmed from a leader in the Alesa-Eleme 
community and was eventually proven to be false by officials 
[67].
Conclusion
This study identified the significant factors leading to perfor-
mance challenges across state-owned refineries in Nigeria. 
Using a framework of Political, Economic, Social and Tech-
nical (PEST) factors, the challenging factors identified from 
the literature were categorised and measured via a Likert-type 
questionnaire. The result indicates that, although, the effects of 
all the PEST factors were considered important to the refiner-
ies’ performance; however, political, technical, and economic 
factors, were viewed as more significant than the social factors.
Overall, the emergent significant factors from the study 
include government interference, funding issues, political 
indecision, theft and pipeline attacks, cost of spare parts, 
maintenance issues, operating capital, feedstock supply, staff 
training and competence issues.
Considering these results, it will, therefore, be rational to 
make the following recommendations:
• A structural change in the ownership and control of the 
refineries would be required to drive positive change. 
A transition from total government control to a private 
sector-led partnership arrangement between the govern-
ment and industry would be essential to infuse the nec-
essary technical, financial, and managerial capabilities 
required to overcome unnecessary bureaucratic barriers. 
Essentially, this will promote faster decision-making and 
financial independence to effectively manage the refiner-
ies.
Applied Petrochemical Research 
1 3
• The complete removal of regulations on the downstream 
petroleum market in Nigeria would be necessary to 
attract the interest of the private sector for any partner-
ship arrangements.
• Consideration should be given for re-engaging the 
refineries with their original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) for an ongoing technical assistance.
• The interest of oil thieves and illegal/artisanal refiners 
can be re-channelled towards more productive endeav-
ours that will benefit the industry. This can be achieved 
through improved training programmes (both local and 
international) that will encourage the development of rel-
evant skills to the oil and gas sector, such as welding, fab-
rication and other technical crafts, that will enable more 
youths to gain meaningful employment in the industry.
• Aside from the use of military checkpoints to checkmate 
the activities of unrepentant vandals, the use of technol-
ogy, such as drones, CCTV, and other internet of things 
(IoT) devices, can be deployed to beat the hoodlums. The 
savings accruing from plugging additional oil losses due 
to pipeline damage would justify the cost of such technol-
ogy deployment.
This study contributes to the academic discourse towards 
achieving efficiency in the management and operations of 
NNPC refineries. The findings of this study alongside its rec-
ommendations will benefit policy-makers while seeking to 
address the challenges of the refineries.
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